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_ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This interlocutory appeal involves the validity of a 
copyright in a full-body banana costume. Appellant Kangaroo 
Manufacturing Inc. concedes that the banana costume it 
manufactures and sells is substantially similar to the banana 
costume created and sold by Appellee Rasta Imposta. See infra 
Appendix A. Yet Kangaroo claims that Rasta cannot hold a 
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valid copyright in such a costume’s “pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. This dispute presents a 
matter of first impression for our Court and requires us to apply 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. 
Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). We hold that, in 
combination, the Rasta costume’s non-utilitarian, sculptural 
features are copyrightable, so we will affirm the District 
Court’s preliminary injunction. 
I 
This dispute stems from a business relationship that 
went bad. In 2010, Rasta obtained Copyright Registration No. 
VA 1-707-439 for its full-body banana costume. Two years 
later, Rasta began working with a company called Yagoozon, 
Inc., which purchased and resold thousands of Rasta’s banana 
costumes. Yagoozon’s founder, Justin Ligeri, also founded 
Kangaroo and at all relevant times was aware of Rasta’s 
copyright registration in the banana costume. After the 
business relationship between Rasta and Yagoozon ended, 
Rasta’s CEO, Robert Berman, discovered Kangaroo selling a 
costume that resembled his company’s without a license. 
Rasta sued Kangaroo for copyright infringement, trade 
dress infringement, and unfair competition. After settlement 
discussions were unsuccessful, Rasta moved for a preliminary 
injunction and Kangaroo responded by moving to dismiss. The 
District Court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction 
and explained its reasons for doing so in a thorough opinion. 
See Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. 
Supp. 3d 754 (D.N.J. 2018). It also dismissed the unfair 
competition count. Kangaroo appealed, but because the 
District Court had not entered an order detailing the 
injunction’s terms, we granted the parties’ motion to remand 
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for the limited purpose of entering a corrected order. The 
District Court amended its order, and the injunction is now ripe 
for review on appeal. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1338(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1). We review the District Court’s conclusions of 
law de novo and its ultimate decision to grant the preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion. Child Evangelism 
Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 
514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004).1 
III 
Kangaroo claims the injunction should not have issued 
because Rasta is not likely to succeed on the merits of its 
copyright infringement claim.2 According to Kangaroo, Rasta 
                                                 
1 Kangaroo argues that the District Court erred by 
failing to apply the heightened mandatory injunction standard. 
See Trinity Indus. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 139 
(3d Cir. 2013). We disagree for the reasons the District Court 
articulated: Rasta’s motion for a preliminary injunction did not 
request all or substantially all of its relief in a way that the relief 
could not later be undone. See Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 
582–83 (3d Cir. 1980). And Rasta’s preliminary injunction 
motion merely sought to maintain the status quo the parties 
agreed to in their Stipulation of Standstill. See id. 
2 The other three prerequisites for injunctive relief are 
not at issue. 
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does not hold a valid copyright in its banana costume. Whether 
Rasta’s copyright is valid is a question of law, which makes 
our review plenary. See Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique 
Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir. 1990).3 And we must remain 
“cognizant of the Supreme Court’s teaching that copyrights 
protect only expressions of ideas and not ideas themselves.” Id. 
at 671 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)). 
We begin by analyzing whether non-utilitarian, 
sculptural features of the costume are copyrightable by 
determining whether those features can be identified separately 
from its utilitarian features and are capable of existing 
independently from its utilitarian features. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101; Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1008. We then consider 
whether the merger and scenes a faire doctrines render the 
costume ineligible for copyright protection. We conclude that 
the District Court did not err when it held that Rasta is 
reasonably likely to prove ownership of a valid copyright. 
                                                 
3 Registering a work’s copyright within five years of the 
work’s first publication entitles the holder to a presumption of 
validity. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). A later-filed registration may 
still be probative though. See id. (“The evidentiary weight to 
be accorded [a later-filed] certificate . . . shall be within the 
discretion of the court.”). Here, Rasta’s Certificate of 
Registration lists a 2001 first publication date and a 2010 
registration date, so it is not entitled to the statutory 
presumption of validity, though we may consider the 
registration’s existence in our analysis. 
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A 
“A valid copyright extends only to copyrightable 
subject matter.” Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1008. 
Copyrightable subject matter means “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a). Originality is a very low bar, requiring “only 
a minimal amount of creativity.” Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor 
Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2005). “Works of 
authorship include . . . pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5), which are “two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
[etc.],” id. § 101. “And a work of authorship is ‘fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression when it is embodied in a’ 
‘material object . . . from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated.’” Star Athletica, 137 
S. Ct. at 1008 (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
A special rule applies to “useful article[s],” i.e., those 
which have “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely 
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). Without more, 
they may not receive protection as such. Id. Instead, useful 
articles that “incorporate[] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable 
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article” may be eligible for protection of those features alone. 
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). Thus, separability analysis 
determines whether a useful article contains copyrightable 
features. 
A useful article’s design feature “is eligible for 
copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the 
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useful article, it would qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in some other 
tangible medium.” Id. at 1012 (describing separability 
analysis). So we ask two questions: (1) can the artistic feature 
of the useful article’s design “be perceived as a two- or three-
dimensional work of art separate from the useful article[?]” and 
(2) would the feature “qualify as a protectable pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other 
medium if imagined separately from the useful article[?]” Id. 
at 1016.  
The first requirement “is not onerous. The 
decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article 
and spot some two- or three-dimensional element that appears 
to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.” Id. at 1010.  
The second requirement, which is “ordinarily more 
difficult to satisfy,” requires “that the separately identified 
feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.” Id. (“In other words, the feature must be 
able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work as 
defined in § 101 once it is imagined apart from the useful 
article.”). And that separate feature “cannot itself be a useful 
article or ‘an article that is normally a part of a useful article’ 
(which is itself considered a useful article).” Id. (alteration 
omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). We do not focus on “any 
aspects of the useful article that remain after the imaginary 
extraction.” Id. at 1013. Nor does the work’s marketability or 
artistic merit bear on our analysis. See id. at 1015. Thus, the 
two-part inquiry effectively turns on whether the separately 
imagined features are still intrinsically useful. 
We have explained that we do not analyze each feature 
in isolation; instead, a “specific combination of elements” that 
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gives a sculpture “its unique look” could be eligible for 
copyright protection. Kay Berry, 421 F.3d at 209 (emphasis 
added). Those combined features may include “texture, color, 
size, and shape,” among others, and it “means nothing that 
these elements may not be individually entitled to protection.” 
Id. at 207; see also Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012 (analyzing 
the uniform designs’ “arrangement of colors, shapes, stripes, 
and chevrons” together, not individually). 
The Supreme Court in Star Athletica found the two-
dimensional design patterns on cheerleader uniforms eligible 
for copyright protection. Id. The uniform’s utilitarian “shape, 
cut, and dimensions” were not copyrightable, but “the two-
dimensional work of art fixed in the tangible medium of the 
uniform fabric” was. Id. at 1013. Imagining those designs apart 
from the uniform did not necessarily replicate the useful article 
even though the designs still looked like uniforms. See id. at 
1012. 
The Star Athletica Court also provided helpful 
examples addressing three-dimensional articles. First, it 
reaffirmed its decision in Mazer, which held that a statuette 
depicting a dancer, intended for use as a lamp base, was 
eligible for copyright protection. Id. at 1011 (citing 347 U.S. at 
214, 218–19). Second, the Court noted that a replica of a useful 
article (cardboard model car) could be copyrightable, although 
the underlying article (the car itself) could not. Id. at 1010. 
Finally, the Court noted that a shovel, “even if displayed in an 
art gallery,” still has an intrinsic utilitarian function beyond 
portraying its appearance or conveying information. Id. at 1013 
n.2. So it could not be copyrighted, even though a drawing of 
a shovel or any separately identifiable artistic features could. 
Id. We too have observed that “just because a sculpture is 
incorporated into an article that functions as other than a pure 
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sculpture does not mean that the sculptural part of the article is 
not copyrightable.” Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 669. 
B 
Having articulated the legal principles that govern our 
analysis, we turn to the particular facts of this case. To begin 
with, Rasta’s banana costume is a “useful article.”4 The artistic 
features of the costume, in combination, prove both separable 
and capable of independent existence as a copyrightable work: 
a sculpture. Those sculptural features include the banana’s 
combination of colors, lines, shape, and length. They do not 
include the cutout holes for the wearer’s arms, legs, and face; 
the holes’ dimensions; or the holes’ locations on the costume, 
because those features are utilitarian.5 Although more difficult 
                                                 
4 We have noted that “a costume . . . may serve, aside 
from its appearance, to clothe the wearer.” Masquerade 
Novelty, 912 F.2d at 670. Star Athletica addressed cheerleader 
uniforms as useful articles. 137 S. Ct. at 1010. And Rasta 
concedes its costume is a useful article. 
5 The District Court correctly found “that the cutout 
holes are not, per se, a feature eligible for copyright” because 
they “perform a solely utilitarian function.” Silvertop, 319 F. 
Supp. 3d at 764. It went on, however, to list “the location of 
the head and arm cutouts which dictate how the costume drapes 
on and protrudes from a wearer (as opposed to the mere 
existence of the cutout holes)” among the copyrightable 
features. Id. at 765. We disagree with that portion of the 
District Court’s analysis because we must imagine the banana 
apart from the useful (i.e., wearable) article. Rasta has not 
identified any artistic aspect to the holes’ dimensions or 
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to imagine separately from the costume’s “non-appearance 
related utility” (i.e., wearability) than many works, 
Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 669, one can still imagine the 
banana apart from the costume as an original sculpture. That 
sculpted banana, once split from the costume, is not 
intrinsically utilitarian and does not merely replicate the 
costume, so it may be copyrighted. 
Kangaroo responds that we must inspect each feature 
individually, find each one too unoriginal or too utilitarian in 
isolation for copyright, and decline to protect the whole. But 
Kay Berry forecloses this divide-and-conquer approach by 
training our focus on the combination of design elements in a 
work. See 421 F.3d at 209–10 (focusing on “the specific 
combination of elements [] employed to give [a work] its 
unique look”). And the Star Athletica Court did not cherry-pick 
the uniform designs’ colors, shapes, or lines; it too evaluated 
their combination. 137 S. Ct. at 1012 (focusing on “the 
arrangement of colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the 
surface of the cheerleading uniforms”). Thus, the separately 
imagined banana—the sum of its non-utilitarian parts—is 
copyrightable. 
Kangaroo also contends the banana is unoriginal 
because its designers based the design on a natural banana. 
They ask us to hold that depictions of natural objects in their 
natural condition can never be copyrighted. This argument 
                                                 
locations except in relation to the wearer. The cutout holes’ 
dimensions and locations on the costume are intrinsically 
useful (perhaps even necessary) to make the costume wearable 
like the “shape, cut, and dimensions” of the cheerleader 
uniforms in Star Athletica, so they cannot be copyrighted. 137 
S. Ct. at 1012. 
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seeks to raise the originality requirement’s very low bar, which 
precedent forecloses for good reason. See Kay Berry, 421 F.3d 
at 207. A judge’s own aesthetic judgments must play no role in 
copyright analysis. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1015. “Our 
inquiry is limited to how the article and feature[s] are 
perceived, not how or why they were designed.” Id. The cases 
Kangaroo cites in its brief confirm that whether natural objects 
are copyrightable depends on the circumstances. Compare 
Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that a sculpture of a jellyfish was not copyrightable), with 
Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 
2009) (holding that several elements of a plush toy depicting a 
tree frog were copyrightable). The essential question is 
whether the depiction of the natural object has a minimal level 
of creativity. Rasta’s banana meets those requirements. 
In furtherance of its argument that costumes depicting 
items found in nature can never be copyrighted, Kangaroo 
relies on Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 
452 (2d Cir. 1989). Whimsicality involved a company’s 
misrepresentation of its costumes as only “soft sculpture” on 
its application for copyright registration, without any 
indication (written or pictorial) that they could be worn. Id. at 
456. Unlike that case, here the Copyright Office recognized 
that Rasta sought to copyright a costume and initially refused 
to register a copyright because it was a costume. Additionally, 
the Whimsicality court imagined the costumes peeled away 
from their wearers as deflated piles of fabric, leaving nothing 
recognizable or original to copyright. See id. Star Athletica 
does not allow that approach in this appeal. The three-
dimensional banana sculpture that separability analysis 
requires us to imagine is not a crumpled pile of fabric; it is a 
recognizable rendering of a banana. See Star Athletica, 137 S. 
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Ct. at 1012 (requiring courts to imagine the separated work “on 
its own or when fixed in some other tangible medium” 
(emphasis added)). Courts have not, as Kangaroo claims, 
“consistently found that costumes of natural items, such as 
bees and pumpkins, cannot be copyrighted.” Reply Br. 5; see 
also Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Indus., 620 F. Supp. 175, 188 
(D. Minn. 1985) (finding a slipper in the shape of a bear’s paw 
copyrightable), aff’d mem., 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986). 
Indeed, the Second Circuit focused its decision on 
Whimsicality’s misrepresentation to the Copyright Office and 
did not even reach the question whether costumes are an 
exception to the general rule that clothing is not copyrightable. 
891 F.2d at 455–56. In our view, the non-utilitarian, sculptural 
features of this costume are just such an exception.6 
We therefore hold that the banana costume’s 
combination of colors, lines, shape, and length (i.e., its artistic 
features) are both separable and capable of independent 
existence, and thus are copyrightable. 
C 
Lastly, Kangaroo invokes two copyright doctrines—
merger and scenes a faire—to argue the banana costume is 
ineligible for protection. Both arguments address the same 
                                                 
6 Kangaroo’s reliance on the underlying district court 
decision in Whimsicality is also misplaced because that 
decision, though carefully reasoned, employed a separability 
analysis inconsistent with the analysis required by Star 
Athletica. See Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costumes Co., 721 
F. Supp. 1566, 1572–76 (E.D.N.Y.), order aff’d in part, 
vacated in part sub nom., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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question: whether copyrighting the banana costume would 
effectively monopolize an underlying idea, either directly or 
through elements necessary to that idea’s expression.  
Because Congress has excluded “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery” from copyright protection, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), 
courts deny such protection when a work’s underlying idea can 
effectively be expressed in only one way. Courts term this rare 
occurrence “merger,” and find it only when “there are no or 
few other ways of expressing a particular idea.” Educ. Testing 
Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). And if copyrighting a design feature 
would effectively monopolize an underlying idea, procedure, 
process, etc., then the merger doctrine exists to deny that 
protection. See Kay Berry, 421 F.3d at 209. Notably, merger 
“is most applicable where the idea and the expression are of 
items found in nature, or are found commonly in everyday 
life.” Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 
25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001). But if copyright does not foreclose 
“other methods of expressing [an] idea . . . as a practical 
matter, then there is no merger.” Educ. Testing Servs., 793 F.2d 
at 539 (quoting Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1253). 
Here, copyrighting Rasta’s banana costume would not 
effectively monopolize the underlying idea because there are 
many other ways to make a costume resemble a banana. 
Indeed, Rasta provided over 20 non-infringing examples. As 
the District Court observed, one can easily distinguish those 
examples from Rasta’s costume based on the shape, curvature, 
tips, tips’ color, overall color, length, width, lining, texture, and 
material. See Silvertop Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 768. We 
agree and hold the merger doctrine does not apply here. 
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Courts also exclude scenes a faire from copyright 
protection, which include elements “standard, stock, or 
common to a particular topic or that necessarily follow from a 
common theme or setting.” Dun & Bradstreet Software 
Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 
F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993)). The doctrine covers “those 
elements of a work that necessarily result[] from external 
factors inherent in the subject matter of the work.” Id. at 215 
(quoting Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th 
Cir. 1997)). As with merger, the scenes a faire doctrine seeks 
to curb copyright’s potential to allow monopolizing an 
underlying idea—via features that are so common or necessary 
to that idea’s expression that copyrighting them effectively 
copyrights the idea itself. E.g., Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1374–75 
(citing foot chases as a scene a faire of police fiction). 
Here too, copyrighting the banana costume’s non-
utilitarian features in combination would not threaten such 
monopolization. Kangaroo points to no specific feature that 
necessarily results from the costume’s subject matter (a 
banana). Although a banana costume is likely to be yellow, it 
could be any shade of yellow—or green or brown for that 
matter. Although a banana costume is likely to be curved, it 
need not be—let alone in any particular manner. And although 
a banana costume is likely to have ends that resemble a natural 
banana’s, those tips need not look like Rasta’s black tips (in 
color, shape, or size). Again, the record includes over 20 
examples of banana costumes that Rasta concedes would be 
non-infringing. The scenes a faire doctrine does not apply here 
either. 
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* * * 
Because Rasta established a reasonable likelihood that 
it could prove entitlement to protection for the veritable fruits 
of its intellectual labor, we will affirm.  
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